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Editor's Introduction 
Conceptualizing the French 
Revolution: Problems 
and Methods 
The Shadow of Furet 
In France, for roughly half a century, Marxist historians enjoyed a 
virtual monopoly over the academic historiography of the French Re­
volution. Beginning in 1928 the Sorbonne's prestigious chair in the 
History of the French Revolution was reserved for historians with a 
demonstrable commitment to socialism. The combination of a rigid hier­
archy in French academia and a leftist orientation among French intel­
lectuals more generally - particularly during the quarter century after 
World War II, when the fabled anti-fascist record of communism pro­
vided it with moral authority- made it nearly impossible to challenge the 
reigning orthodoxy. It was only with the decline of communist hege­
mony in intellectual circles after 1968, and from a rival institution, the 
Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (later renamed the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales), that a "revisionist" assault 
on the prevailing orthodoxy could successfully be launched, opening the 
way to a rich and diverse historiography of the Revolution. 
The first in the Sorbonne's academic dynasty was Albert Mathiez 
(1874-1932), a disciple of the martyred socialist leader Jean Jaures 
(1859-1914) and early supporter of the Bolshevik Revolution, whose 
roots he traced to the French Revolution. Succeeding Mathiez was 
Georges Lefebvre ( 18 7 4-19 5 9), who continued the tradition of Marxist 
scholarship and spread the word to the Anglo-American world with 
popular and widely-read English translations of his principal works. 1
1 See esp. Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution: 1789, trans. 
R. R. Palmer (Princeton University Press, 194 7) and The French Revolution, trans. 
Elizabeth Moss Evanson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962-4), 2 vols. 
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Finally, Lefebvre's successor, Albert Soboul ( 1914-82 ). presided over 
the dissolution of the Marxist empire in the 19 70s when his com­
patriot Franc;ois Furet ( 19 2 7-9 7) launched the first in a series of 
challenges to the Sorbonne's supremacy. Although Mathiez. Lefebvre 
and Soboul were not of one mind on all aspects of the Revolution. 
they shared Karl Marx's conviction that this world-historical event 
had occurred because an increasingly wealthy and self-confident class 
of capitalists known as the bourgeoisie, frustrated with a monarchy 
that had privileged a landed or "feudal·· aristocracy. overthrew it in favor
of a "liberal" political and legal order supportive of their own economic 
interests. 
Long before members of the French academic community challenged 
this interpretation. historians in the United States and the United 
Kingdom began offering alternative explanations . Indeed. as early as 
1929 the Harvard Professor Crane Brinton ( 1898-1908) argued. on 
the basis of tax records recording the relative wealth of men1bers of the 
revolutionary Jacobin clubs. that they "contain[ed] rich and poor. 
laborer and intellectual. speculator and re11tier." He concluded that these 
revolutionaries were "economically so disparate that no simple econ­
omic interest [ could] hold them together," and suggested rather that "a 
philosophy. an ideal. a faith. a loyalty," had brought them together. 2 In 
l 9h4 Alfred Cobban. a British historian of France, clai1ned that the
bourgeoisie. understood in the Marxist sense of a class of capitalists.
played a relatively s1nall role in the Revolution. i The following year an
American, Elisabeth Eisenstein. argued that .. 'France ·s bourgeoisie· did
not initiate the protest movement of l 788 and did not play a prominent
role in the events and reforms of 1789. " 4 In 19 h 7 her compatriot
George V. Taylor stated that it was "impossible to equate the identifiable
leadership of the upper Third Estate - the 'revolutionary bourgeoisie' -
with a social class that played a common role in the relations of pro­
duction, or. more precisely. owned the instruments of production in an
emergent capitalist economy ... :;
These Anglo-American objections made little impact in France, and 
even in the United States the notion that the Revolution stemmed from 
2 Crane Brinton, "The Membership of the Jacobin Clubs," Amerirnn Historirnl 
Review 34 (July 1929): 751. 
3 Alfred Cobban, The Social lnterpretntion of the French Remlution ( Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1964 ). 
4 Elisabeth L. Eisenstein. "Who Intervened in 1788? A Commentary on The 
Coming of the French Revolution." Amerirnn Historirnl Revinv 7 l (October 196 5 ): 
101. 
5 George V. Taylor, "Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolu­
tion," Amerirnn Historirnl Review 72 (January 1967): 495. 
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a rising bourgeoisie was a commonplace of many textbooks. 6 Historians 
around the world paid attention, however, when a former member of 
the French Communist Party attacked his erstwhile comrades. In 19 71, 
in a widely-read historical journal, Fran9ois Furet wrote an article 
denouncing what he called the "revolutionary catechism" by which 
Marxist historians explained the Revolution. 7 In 19 7 8 he expanded his 
analysis into a book, Penser Ia Revolution franfaise, which offered a radi­
cally new interpretation of the Revolution's origins and character. 8 In 
that book, a selection of which comprises the first excerpt in this volume, 
Furet argued that the Revolution was not the result of a triumphant 
bourgeois class and that its various events and phases could not be 
explained in terms of class struggle. 
Yet Furet did not merely dispute the prevalent orthodoxy. He supplied 
a sophisticated theory of the Revolution's origins and character. 
Drawing on the analysis of the nineteenth-century historian and pol­
itical theorist Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59), he claimed that the 
absolute monarchy of Louis XIV and his successors had paradoxically 
contributed to the development of a democratic or egalitarian ideology 
among the French. 9 By depriving the old corporate structures of society 
of their power, according to this theory, the crown induced its subjects 
to grant moral authority to "men of letters," who necessarily lacked 
political experience and instead propagated abstract ideas about equal­
ity and the sovereignty of the people. Borrowing from historian 
Augustin Cochin ( 18 7 6-1916), Furet completed his analysis of the 
Revolution's origins by describing the "channels" or mechanisms by 
which the new revolutionary ideology came to permeate French society. 
It was through the "caf es, salons, Masonic lodges and the so-called 
societes de pensee, or 'philosophical societies,' " Furet argued, that the 
democratic ideology was disseminated. 10 Yet because the state never rec­
ognized these "centres of democratic sociability" as legitimate forums 
6 R. R. Palmer, whose translation of Lefebvre's Quatre-vingt-neuf was a staple of 
many history courses, summarized the causes of the French Revolution in his own 
popular textbook: "The Revolution was the collision of two moving objects, a rising 
aristocracy and a rising bourgeoisie." A History of the Modern World (New York: 
Knopf, 19 50), 344. 
7 Frarn;ois _Furet, "Le Catechisme revolutionnaire," Annales E.S.C. 26 
(March-April 1971): 255-89. 
8 Frarn;ois Furet, Penser la Revolution fran(:aise (Paris: Gallimard, 1978). The 
English version is Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster ( Cambridge 
and Paris: Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l 'Homme, 1978). 
9 Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart 
Gilbert (New York: Anchor Books, 19 5 5). 
10 Cf. Augustin Cochin, Les Societes de pensee et la democratie; etudes d'histoire 
revolutionnaire (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie, 19 21 ). 
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through which grievances might be aired, the new, unofficial institu­
tions of an oppressed society acquired a peculiar conception of power. 
Unlike the English, who supposedly learned through their representa­
tive institutions how to negotiate disagreements with the state, the 
French evidently developed an image of power as absolute, undivided 
(and indivisible), and of politics as a mortal struggle in which no com­
promise was possible. When the Revolution broke out. according to 
Furet. no individuals or groups could admit to holding power. which had 
been sullied by the reputation it had acquired under absolutism. Only 
"the people" could rightly exercise power. and politics consequently 
became a n1atter of persuasively expressing or interpreting the people's 
will. The Revolution. according to Furet. therefore "ushered in a world 
where mental representations of power governed all actions. and where 
a network of signs completely dominated political life." Finally. because 
of the absolute conception of po\\'er inherited from the Old Regime. all 
political actors were doomed to view their opponents as wicked con­
spirators who must be crushed. The result of this "logical evolution." 
Furet argued. was the Reign of Terror. 
It \-\'Ould be difficult to exaggerate the impact of Furet' s analysis 
on the historiography of the French Revolution over the past three 
decades. Not only did Furet break the monopoly of the orthodox inter­
pretation in France. To a great degree he set the agenda for new and 
innovative scholarship on the Revolution. Historians committed to some 
form of class analysis were forced to rethink their assumptions about 
precisely \\'hat the bourgeoisie was and in just what ways the Revolu­
tion represented its ascendancy. Historians not holding such a commit­
ment explored aspects of the Revolution's origins and course to which 
Furet had pointed but that he had not exhaustively analyzed. and 
addressed questions that he had raised or implied without explicitly or 
conclusively answering them. 
The subsequent historiography has frequently been understood in 
terms of authors' approval or disapproval of the Revolution and their 
place on the right. left or middle of the political spectrum. For example, 
Jack Censer has examined Furet' s "negative evaluation of the revolu­
tion," determined that Keith Michael Baker and Lynn Hunt (both 
included in this volume) along with other historians were "critical of the 
revolution." and wondered how to explain this "common pessimism 
about the revolution." He believes that "political bias, an expression of 
the political conservatism of the 19 80s," is "too crude an explanation." 
He nevertheless has recourse to a political explanation, arguing that in 
recent years "many on the left have been more concerned with individ­
ual liberties than with social justice for all" and that "[s]uch an empha­
sis decreases the likelihood that scholars with leftist views will end up 
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defending a revolution long on equality and short on liberty." 11 Alter­
natively, Gary Kates has divided recent historians of the French Revolu­
tion into Marxists on the left, "Neo-Conservatives" on the right, and 
"Neo-Liberals" in the center. Moreover, he sees these labels as corres­
ponding to historians' relative sympathy or hostility to the Revolution 
in its various phases: with Marxists endorsing the entire Revolution, 
including the Reign of Terror: Neo-Liberals supporting the early, less 
violent stages of the Revolution, and Neo-Conservatives (including 
Furet) deploring it altogether. 12 More cautiously, Gwynne Lewis has
written, "Some would argue that to identify . . . 'revisionist' historians 
with liberalism or liberal/ conservatism would be going too far. I would, 
however, be prepared to take a few strides in that direction." 13
Yet the terms of left and right, liberal and conservative are often so 
relative and ambiguous that they risk obscuring more than they explain 
about the historiography of the Revolution. Adding the prefix "neo" 
does little to clarify matters, as does placing a slash between the terms; 
and relating these apparent political positions to positive or negative 
assessments of the Revolution only adds to the confusion. In particular, 
the notion that the Revolution was "long on equality and short on 
liberty," which Censer seems to accept and attributes to historians on 
"the left," is precisely the view of Tocqueville, whose views on democ­
racy were very different from those held by people on "the left" today. 
More seriously still, the traditional political spectrum is ill-suited to 
describe much of the feminist scholarship whose impact on the histori­
ography of the Revolution has been decisive. 
Specifically, Joan Scott, whose work on the Revolution is excerpted in 
this volume (chapter 7), argues that the terms by which the Revolution 
defined citizenship effectively and inevitably excluded women from the 
national sovereignty that was otherwise loudly proclaimed to be 
universal. The concept of citizenship was gendered, 14 and its gender was
masculine. Scott suggests that feminists, beginning with Olympe de 
Gouges during the Revolution, have been handicapped by a political lan­
guage that necessarily defined liberation in terms of the rights of "man". 
11 Jack R. Censer, "Commencing the Third Century of Debate," American Histor­
ical Review 94 (December 1989): 1318, 1323, 1324. 
12 Gary Kates, ed., The French Revolution: Recent Debates and New Controversies 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 1-20. 
13 Gwynne Lewis, The French Revolution: Rethinking the Debate (London and New 
York: Routledge, 199 3 ), unpaginated preface. 
14 For an explanation of how the concept of "gender" can be used by historians 
see Joan W. Scott, "Gender as a Useful Category of Historical Analysis," American 
Historical Review 91 (December 1986): 1053-75, reprinted in her Feminism and 
History (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996 ), 152-80. 
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Thus she is, on feminist grounds, critical of the Revolution from its very 
inception, and critical as well of its legacy in political philosophy. 1"
Where does this situate her on the familiar left to right political spec­
trum? Like Furet, she has engaged in a thorough critique of revolution­
ary ideology. Yet to call her a conservative (or Neo-Conservative) would 
be absurd. To designate her a liberal would be equally wrong. After all. 
she concludes, "[T]he recurrence since the Revolution of feminist cri­
tiques reminds us not only that the democratic promise of liberal ( and 
socialist and republican) political theory is as yet unfulfilled. but also 
that it may be impossible of fulfilment in the terms in which it has so far 
been conceived." Indeed, it is precisely Scott's feminist critique of the 
gendered terms of the political spectrum that makes the latter inade­
quate to account for that critique's political meaning. 
Kates acknowledges that feminists as well as the "Neo-Conservatives" 
have criticized the Revolution. yet his attempt to resolve this apparent 
paradox is highly questionable. He writes. "[I]t is one of the great ironies 
of historical scholarship that ... left-wing feminist scholarship has so 
far been more fruitfully deployed by Neo-Conservative Revisionist schol­
ars than by anyone else." 1 h How the "left-wing" character of feminist 
historiography fits into the definition of political positions according to 
sympathy or criticism of the Revolution is not explained . and Scott's 
suggestion that feminism does not have a place on the gendered politi­
cal spectrum makes this term even less plausible. 17 Moreover. the 
emphasis on the apparent success of "Neo-Conservative Revisionist 
scholars" in "deploying" feminism obscures the more obvious success 
that feminist scholars have had in "deploying" their own claims.18 As 
evidence for this apparent appropriation of ''left-wing" feminism by the 
right, Kates refers to Simon Schama's Citizens. a narrative history that 
synthesized and popularized numerous scholarly critiques of the Re-
1 5 Scott has expanded her analysis in Only Pnmdoxes to OJJ<1r: French Feminists nnd 
the Rights of Mnn (Cambridge. MA and London: Harvard University Press. 1996). 
16 Kates. French Revolution, l 5. 
17 To be precise. Kates's example of feminist historiography is not Joan Scott but 
Joan Landes. Yet Landes similarly engages in a thoroughgoing critique of revolu­
tionary ideology on the basis of its masculinist discourse. Joan B. Landes, Women 
nnd the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988). 
18 Feminist historiography of the French Revolution has grown dramatically in 
little over a decade. In addition to the work of Scott and Landes, see esp. Dorinda 
Outram, The Body nnd the French Revolution: Sex, Class nnd Political Culture (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989): Olwen H. Hufton, Women and the Limits of 
Citizenship in the French Revolution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1992): 
and Madelyn Gutwirth, The Twilight of the Goddesses: Women and Representation in 
the French Revolutionary Era (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992). 
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volution, feminist and otherwise. Here Kates selectively applies his 
schema that equates critique of the revolutionaries with conservatism 
by comparing Schama to Margaret Thatcher. Not only does this implic­
itly place feminists such as Scott in the same category as Thatcher, an 
absurdity that Kates does not contemplate but to which his logic 
inevitably leads. It mutilates Schama's politics as expressed in Citizens. 
Indeed, in one of his own rare allusions to contemporary politics . 
Schama criticizes the laissez-faire economic policy of Louis XVI's minis­
ter Turgot as comparable to that of Thatcher's ally in capitalism. Ronald 
Reagan. 19 Meanwhile. Kates is compelled to dismiss Schama's feminist 
critique of revolutionary political culture as disingenuous, a mere 
"appropriation of feminist history for Neo-Conservative purposes." 
rather than entertaining the more plausible claim that Schama actually 
believes the feminist views he puts forth. 20 When assun1ptions about the 
sincerity of historians are necessary to make one's preferred explana­
tory categories operate consistently. then it is time to think about just 
how explanatory those categories are. 
To be sure, as Gwynne Lewis rightly observes. it would be na·ive "to 
pretend that history can be written in an ideological vacuum. "21 What­
ever the historians' intentions. their work will often be interpreted in 
light of contemporary politics. This is all the more true when the subject 
in question is as politically charged as revolution. Yet to see the recent 
historiography of the Revolution solely in terms of a political contest is 
to deprive it of much of its conceptual depth and scholarly relevance. Of 
course, the old debate continues over the bourgeois origins of the 
Revolution. Colin Jones, in his "Great Chain of Buying: Medical Adver­
tisement, the Bourgeois Public Sphere, and the Origins of the French 
Revolution" (chapter 5 ). detects a vibrant and increasingly radical bour­
geoisie in the readers of the late eighteenth-century provincial press. 
Sarah Maza, in her "Luxury. Morality. and Social Change: Why There 
Was No Middle-Class Consciousness in Pre-Revolutionary France" 
( chapter 6 ). argues that the French of the eighteenth century ( unlike 
their British counterparts) did not think of their society as being led by 
a middle class in the modern sense ( as defined in terms of wealth) and 
that it is anachronistic to attribute a causal role to a "bourgeoisie" that 
contemporaries would not have recognized. Yet these pieces are more 
interesting for their methodological implications than for their affinity 
19 Schama writes of Turgot's policies. 't\ll this was, of course. the direct ancestor 
of supply-side public finance, and had just about as much chance of success as its 
version two hundred years later in a different but similarly fiscally overstretched 
empire." Citizens: A Clironicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf. 1989). 82. 
20 Kates. French Revolution. 1 5. 
21 Lewis, French Revolution, unpaginated preface. 
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or antipathy to Marxism, to say nothing of their approval or disapproval 
of the Revolution. Thus Jones's analysis is interesting largely because it 
ingeniously combines elements of economic history with the history 
of communication and "postmodern" understandings of political 
language. Maza's analysis is interesting primarily because it makes 
innovative use of contemporary literature and drama to decode preva­
lent beliefs regarding luxury, morality and the nature of society in pre­
revolutionary France. 
The excerpts gathered in this volume are therefore not organized 
according to their authors' political inclinations or feelings about the 
Revolution. Nor are they categorized, strictly speaking, according to 
their presumed sub-fields. i.e. intellectual. social. cultural. gender, reli­
gious history. since the most creative historians have been remarkably 
eclectic in combining the methods of the various sub-disciplines. I have 
tried to place some readings close together on the basis of the shared 
problems they address. Thus chapters 2. 3 and 4 all problematize the 
role of ideas in the origins of the French Revolution. Chapters 5 and 6, 
as mentioned above. ask vvhether the concept of class, in particular the 
middle class. can be useful in understanding pre-revolutionary France. 
Chapters 7 and 8 share a common concern vvith gender and bodies in 
revolutionary political culture, and chapters 9 and 10 treat the rela­
tionship between religion and the Revolution. Yet my placement of the 
various readings is not meant to be absolute or exclusive. Chapter 9 is 
as relevant to the issues raised in chapters 2. 3 and 4 as it is to religious 
history. Chapters 5 and 6 have important gender aspects that make 
them worth reading together with chapters 7 and 8. And chapter 8 is 
as much a reflection on the history of religion as are chapters 9 and 10. 
I have tried to elaborate on some of these and other connections in the 
explanatory headnotes to each chapter, but encourage readers to make 
their own connections. and to look for affinities and tensions between 
the various excerpts. 
What all of the readings from chapter 2 through 10 have in common, 
at any rate, is that they implicitly or explicitly address questions that 
Furet raised in his iconoclastic Penser la Revolution franraise. Once Furet 
is seen as having done more than a demolition job on Marxist ortho­
doxy, the full relevance of his work for the subsequent historiography of 
the Revolution can be appreciated. This is not to say that Furet was the 
sole influence on historians of the Revolution, many of whom would 
likely have asked similar questions and treated similar problems for 
other reasons. But the concepts and methods through which Furet 
sought to understand the Revolution played a crucial role in delineat­
ing the contours of future scholarship. The significance of the most 
important scholarship to come after Penser la Revolution franr;aise, 
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accordingly, can be best understood not merely as the expression of 
political positions, but as attempts to address many of those same con­
cepts and methods. 
Intellectual History, Discourse and the "Linguistic Turn" 
Not the least important of Furet' s concepts was that of conceptualiza­
tion itself. Furet argued that most previous historians. whatever their 
political sympathies, had insufficiently conceptualized the Revolution 
that they purportedly sought to understand. What this n1eant in prac­
tice was that they identified \Vith one side or another in the revolu­
tionary struggle and simply narrated its principal events from the 
perspective of their favorite characters. They did not distance then1selves 
from the events they recounted and therefore fell \'ictim to the illusions 
from which the historical actors themselves had suffered. The foren1ost 
of these illusions, according to Furet, was that of a radical break vdth 
the past. The revolutionaries the1nselves had proclaimed such a break. 
which their enemies deplored but did not question. Furet enjoined his­
torians to be skeptical of contemporary perceptions and, \Vhile he rec­
ognized one true break - the rise of mass politics - in the historical fabric 
characterizing the Revolution, he emphasized the continuities in de1110-
cratic thinking and conceptions of po\ver that in his vie\!\' spanned the 
Old Regime and the revolutionary period. 
By underscoring these continuities. Furet highlighted the problen1 of 
the Revolution's origins. The question of origins is not an intellectual or 
scholarly problem if the event in question is seen as a mythical begin­
ning, which is precisely how the revolutionaries understood their 
moment in history. (Theologians do not inquire into the origins of cre­
ation. They simply accept it as a given.) Yet questioning the extent of 
such a break from the past entails looking for connections between the 
more and less remote past, conditions that made possible the historical 
phenomenon one seeks to explain. To be fair to Furet's rivals, they con­
ceptualized the Revolution's origins and did not deny its roots in the pre­
vious period, despite his insistence that their explanations involved 
nothing but the rote repetition of the "catechism" formula: the rise of 
the bourgeoisie. By presenting the question of origins as explicitly as he 
did, however, Furet stimulated discussion of this extremely difficult 
problem. The fact that so many of the excerpts in this volume address 
the question of the Revolution's origins is merely a reflection of the his­
toriographical tendency of the past quarter-century. Keith Michael 
Baker, Roger Chartier, Robert Darnton, Colin Jones, Sarah Maza, and 
Dale Van Kley are among the most distinguished, but by no means the 
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only, historians to ask where the Revolution came from. And if the pro­
blem of origins is not new, one of Furet's most important accomplish­
ments was to define. to a great extent. the terms of the investigation. 
In particular. Furet emphasized the importance of ideas for an under­
standing of the Revolution. Even the most cursory examination of his 
writings reveals the prominence of ideas for his historical analysis. The 
excerpt in this volume begins with a critique of "the idea of revolution 
as experienced and perceived by its actors" (my emphasis). Elsewhere 
Furet wrote of "political ideas." the ''idea of equality." the "idea of plot," 
and the "idea that power is the people .
.. 
Variations on the theme of ideas 
are the repeated reference to "notions." "concepts.
.. 
principles." 
"values." and "ideology." Moreover. Furet highlighted the importance of 
"men of letters" for the creation and propagation of ideas. and attrib­
uted particular importance to Rousseau. He called the Revolution "this 
strange offspring of 'p/zilosop/zie, · " 22 suggesting that the Enlightenment 
thinkers or p/zilosoplzes had engendered it. 
But what was the precise relationship between ideas and the events 
known as the French Revolution? It is this question that Keith Michael 
Baker addresses in his essay. "On the Problem of the Ideological Origins 
of the French Revolution" ( chapter 2 ). The results of his inquiry are rel­
evant not only to the historiography of the Revolution. but also to an 
understanding of that branch of the historical discipline known alter­
nately as intellectual history or the history of ideas. For Baker the 
relationship between ideas and events is not as straightforward as often 
suggested. Baker criticizes historians for treating ideas as though they 
were objects capable of influencing action, as though, for example. "the 
Enlightenment" or its constituent "doctrines" could be shown to have 
caused the events later grouped under the heading of the French Re­
volution. He argues: that the perceived influence of ideas on events is an 
illusion of hindsight: that the "ideas" themselves are in fact collections 
of statements that can be (and have been) used in a variety of ways: and 
that the proper object of intellectual history is therefore the ways in 
which people have used particular kinds of statements to make partic­
ular claims. These ways, or instruments. of making claims Baker calls 
discourses. 
What is a discourse? This word appears not only throughout Baker's 
work but in so much of the recent scholarship on the French Revolu­
tion that an understanding of its meaning is crucial. The term was 
popularized by French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-84).23 For 
. 
22 Furet. Interpreting the French Revolution, 2 7-8. 
2 3 See esp. Michel Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on 
Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972). 
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Foucault a discourse was a special kind of language that governed power 
relations in any given society. Its power consisted in its ability to define 
key words such as "normal" and "abnormal," "natural" and "unnatu­
ral," "rational" and "irrational. " "healthy" and "sick." By conferring 
positive attributes to some people and activities and negative traits to 
others. discourses assured the power and legitimacy of certain groups 
and the exclusion or oppression of others. 
For Baker it was the interaction between competing discourses that 
defined the political culture out of which the Revolution emerged. In 
particular. Baker argues that in the second half of the eighteenth 
century three discourses vied for dominance. One discourse praised 
justice. ostensibly the activity of the law courts known as the parlements. 
and was therefore popular among many of the magistrates who wished 
to limit the power of the monarchy. A second discourse valorized will. 
reputedly the principal feature of the sovereign "people" or "nation .
.. 
and defined the thinking of more radical politicians who argued for 
popular sovereignty (as opposed merely to limited monarchy). The third 
discourse lauded reason and legitimized the power of "enlightened" 
bureaucrats who wished to reform the country from above without 
interference from below. Ultimately. according to Baker. the discourse 
of the will defeated the other two and therefore opened the way for the 
radicalism of the Revolution. 
Joan Scott's article, "French Feminists and the Rights of 'Man': 
Olympe de Gouges·s Declarations" (chapter 7), similarly relies upon dis­
course analysis. According to Scott, revolutionary discourse defined 
citizenship in universal terms. It suggested that all individuals. as a sole 
consequence of being human beings. were endowed with the right to 
share in the creation of the laws to which they would be subject. The 
revolutionary principle of equality precluded the special treatment or 
disproportionate empowerment of any particular individual or group. 
At the same time, Scott observes. revolutionary discourse contradicted 
itself by defining this ostensibly "universal" being. the citizen, in terms 
that only applied to certain kinds of people: i.e. white men. Not only did 
the deputies in the various revolutionary assemblies refuse to recognize 
the political rights of women. and only "emancipate" enslaved blacks 
after the successful slave uprising in Saint-Domingue. The very terms in 
which revolutionaries understood the qualities of citizens were thought 
to apply exclusively to white men, not to women or blacks. In her analy­
sis of the contrasting revolutionary representations of men and women. 
Scott observes that citizens were seen as active, free, rational and con­
cerned with the public good. attributes typically associated with men 
(i.e. gendered male), while women were typically defined as passive. 
dependent, emotional and preoccupied with private or domestic 
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concerns. Scott shows that in this linguistic or discursive climate, all 
attempts to argue for women's rights were doomed. The attempts of 
Olympe de Gouges are a case in point. When this revolutionary feminist 
challenged the exclusion of women from the rights of "man," she 
argued on the basis of features that women alone possessed or were 
thought to possess: parental and familial love, courage during child­
birth. and superior physical beauty. These assumptions about the 
special or particular character of women undermined the attempt to 
take part in "universal" citizenship and gave de Gouges's writings the 
appearance of a lobbying effort on behalf of special interests. Yet 
they underscore. in Scott's view. the inescapable strength of the dis­
course that guaranteed the dominance of men over women. Even today, 
Scott argues. "liberal" as well as republican and socialist political ideas 
defined in gendered terms threaten to make feminist critiques ineffec­
tive. and true equality may only be achieved once the old discourses are 
discarded. 
On the surface there \,vould appear to be little in common between 
Scott and Furet. Furet had little if anything to say about the exclusion 
of women from political life. His vvas an exclusively male story. Yet like 
Scott he vvas interested in exposing the internal contradictions in revo­
lutionary ideology. More specifically. he shared Scott's sense that the 
universalistic language of the re\'olutionaries masked the fact that only 
a fraction of the population held povver at any given time. Apart from 
the specifics of their arguments. Scott and Furet share the method of 
discourse analysis. And they are not alone in this respect. Other his­
torians included in this volume have similarly emphasized the impor­
tance of discourse for an understanding of the Revolution. Sarah Maza 
( chapter 6) argues that the absence of a discourse valorizing the middle 
classes and the presence of one that defined society in terms of a moral 
community or family explains why the economic middle of French 
society did not acquire the authority in politics that its English counter­
part enjoyed. Dale Van Kley (chapter 9 ). though he does not use the term 
"discourse," shows hovv conservative champions of absolutism and 
ecclesiastical authority shared with liberal advocates of secular, repre­
sentative government the same legitimizing vocabulary that historians 
have since identified with "the Enlightenment." Even Colin Jones, an 
erstwhile opponent of discourse analysis, has made use of this method 
in his "Great Chain of Buying" article (chapter 5), as will be shown 
below. 
Although historians have had many reasons for their methodologi­
cal preferences, Furet himself arguably did much to prompt a discussion 
of revolutionary discourse, not only because his emphasis on the role of 
ideas called for a more sophisticated methodology than that of tradi-
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tional intellectual history, but also because he used the term himself. He 
complained, for example, that "the historians of the French Revolution 
have taken the revolutionary discourse at face value because they them­
selves have remained locked into that discourse." Elsewhere he argued 
that the Revolution "replaced the conflict of interests for power with a 
competition of discourses for the appropriation of legitimacy" (my 
emphasis). Although he never referred explicitly to Foucault and may 
well have developed his ideas on political language independently of 
him, 24 Furet shared Foucault's insight into the relationship between lan­
guage and power. He saw that, at least under certain circumstances, 
power was not simply a matter of making and executing laws, but of 
defining terms. Unlike Baker, who has generalized the claim that "politi­
cal authority is . . .  essentially a matter of linguistic authority,"25 and 
others who have implicitly accepted this maxim, Furet limited his lin­
guistic analysis to the revolutionary period and suggested that under 
"normal" circumstances language has less influence in determining 
power relations. Nevertheless, his observations about the role of lan­
guage in conferring power during the French Revolution gave special 
significance to the work of historians who would apply Foucault's 
theories to their analyses of the Revolution. 
The emphasis on language, which Furet and other historians have 
used to revitalize both the historiography of the French Revolution and 
the sub-field of intellectual history more generally, is typically called 
"the linguistic turn." It has been criticized not only for its tendency 
toward difficult jargon - itself ironically providing evidence of the claim 
that discourses serve to empower certain groups and exclude others -
but for its apparent lack of concern for action in history. When reading 
Furet's observation that the Revolution "ushered in a world where 
mental representations of power governed all actions, and where a 
network of signs completely dominated political life," one is tempted to 
ask impatiently, What about the storming of the Bastille? What about 
the insurrections, coups d'etat and political executions? What about the 
war with France's neighbors and the civil war within its borders? Was 
the Revolution nothing but a linguistic event? Keith Baker defines the 
term revolution as "a transformation of the discursive practice of the 
community, a moment in which social relations are reconstituted and 
the discourse defining the political relations between individuals and 
groups is radically recast." But not everyone will be satisfied with such 
24 For a more complete analysis of Furet's relationship to Foucault and other the­
orists of language and power see Lynn Hunt's review essay on Penser la Revolution 
f ranraise, History and Theory 2 0 ( 19 81 ): 313-2 3. 
2 5 Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
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a definition. David Bell objects that Baker "comes perilously close to sug­
gesting that the French Revolution had its origins in a kind of rhetori­
cal exercise. in which the rumbling sea of discursivity cast forth a new 
set of meanings that. through their own perverse logic, unconnected to 
France's social and economic turmoil. then unleashed political chaos. 
civil war. the Terror. and ultimately a European conflagration with a 
death toll surpassed only by the holocausts of the two World Wars. "26
The sa1ne criticism might also be applied to the other historians who 
focus on ideas and language at the expense of other aspects of human 
experience. 
The Continuing Relevance of Social Analysis 
Has the historiography of the French Revolution become too focused on 
ideas and language and too inattentive to other forms of activity? 
Readers will have to answer this question for themselves. Yet it is impor­
tant to emphasize that Furet's analysis focused on many aspects of 
human experience, not only language. and that these concerns have 
also played an important role in the work of other historians of the Re­
volution. In many ways. Furet was a traditional social historian. That is 
to say. he relied on the methods of sociology when undertaking histor­
ical analysis. He is normally not categorized as a social historian and is 
typically seen as an intellectual or political historian. Part of the reason 
for this confusion comes from Furet's own writing. After all. Furet 
praised Tocqueville for attempting a "history in the inverse mode of a 
sociological interpretation ..
. 
Yet what he meant by "sociological inter­
pretation·· was a particularly narrow kind of social analysis that 
explained all ideology in terms of class interest. Otherwise. the basic cat­
egories of the social sciences were vital to his analysis. The most basic 
of these categories was "society" itself. 
Daniel Gordon has argued against speaking of "society." "the social ." 
and "sociability" before asking what these terms meant to the women 
and men of the eighteenth century who first employed them.27 Maza 
similarly opposes the tendency of historians "to take [the] 'social' for 
granted" and prefers to ask how the people she studies imagined the 
human groupings in which they found themselves. Yet Furet, for better 
or worse. had no such qualms about speaking of society. Using cat­
egories invented by the German philosopher Hegel in the aftermath of 
26 David A. Bell. "Is the Revolution a Text?" Partisan Review 59 (Spring 1992): 
324. 
2 7 Daniel Gordon. Citizens without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French 
Thought. 1670-1789 (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994). 139. 
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the French Revolution (and in part in order to explain it). he distin­
guished between "the state" and "civil society." He saw these categories 
as real things and analyzed their relationship to each other before. 
during. and after the Revolution. He made his debt to social science even 
more explicit when he wrote that Tocqueville's explanation of the role 
of intellectuals in the radicalization of the French "is not sufficient to 
account for tile sociological conditions that shaped . . .  what was to 
become the revolutionary consciousness" (my emphasis). Indeed, his 
recourse to Cochin resulted from his conviction that Tocqueville was 
insufficiently attuned to sociological structures. Cochin did not merely 
study what "men of letters" wrote and thought. He asked where and 
how they and their readers met. In this respect he was a social historian 
and Furet. by adopting his findings. was a social historian as well. 
Other historians. despite their affinity for the "linguistic turn." have 
managed to combine this methodological tendency with a con1n1it111ent 
to social analysis. They are interested in what people did as well as what 
they said ( or wrote). Indeed. for Baker. the distinction between doing and 
saying is specious. His thinking is infonned by the "Ca111bridge school" 
of linguistics. which asserts that language not only describes: it acts as 
well. 28 (For example. vvhen the police officer says. "You are under 
arrest. 
.. 
this is not n1erely a description. It is also an act.) rvloreo\'er. Baker 
observes that actions without words. such as that of the rioter \1vho picks 
up a stone. nonetheless have an "intellective .. element to the1n. They 
mean something. just as words mean son1ething. and those 111eanings 
are determined by the social context. 
Roger Chartier ( chapter 3) is even rnore indebted to the categories of 
social science. for if Baker considers his intellectual history a fonn of 
social history, Chartier calls for an "enlargement of perspective .. that 
includes the analysis of other practices. It is not sufficient. he n1aintains, 
to study ideas or ideologies and instead he calls for "an approach in 
terms of cultural sociology .
.. 
Like Furet. he insists on the iinportance of 
the forms of "intellectual sociability" out of which the ideas of the 
Enlightenment emerged. This involves examining what Cochin (and 
Furet) believed crucial to the formation of revolutionary ideas: the philo­
sophical societies, Masonic lodges, literary clubs and other "associations 
of the eighteenth century."  Chartier expands the field of investigation 
still further by adapting insights from the German social philosopher 
Jurgen Habermas. According to Habermas, the eighteenth century savv
the rise of a "political public sphere." a metaphorical space between the 
state and "civil society" in which private individuals came together to 
28 On the performative function of language see J. L. Austin. How To Do Tilings 
With Words (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1962). 
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discuss matters of public importance and, eventually, to criticize the 
policies of the state and promote revolutionary ideology. 29 Its institu­
tions included salons, cafes, academies, and journals and it depended 
upon the circulation of printed material. Chartier does not believe 
that the forms of intellectual sociability or the institutions of the public 
sphere themselves necessarily produced democratic or radical ideas. 
He emphasizes the "discordances" between the "discourses that in 
representing the social world proposed its reorganization" and the 
"practices" such as the exclusion of the uneducated from the "public 
sphere," which "created new differentiations and new divisions." Indeed 
he argues that these discordances produced the cultural climate 
that made the Revolution possible. Yet he regards the public sphere as 
a real object of investigation, even if his interpretation of its role in 
the origins of the Revolution is not identical \-Vith that of Haber­
mas. Thus an understanding of discourses is necessary, but not 
sufficient . for Chartier. who like Furet is both an intellectual and a social 
historian. 
Robert Darn ton ( chapter 4) similarly attempts to combine intellectual 
and social history by placing the history of political ideas in the context 
of specific social practices. In particular. he is interested in the history 
of communication. a sub-field of historical scholarship that Habermas 
has done much to promote. The history of communication involves the 
study of how ideas were circulated and has included important studies 
of such topics as the book trade and the publication of newspapers and 
periodicals. rn Darnton himself has written extensively on the history of 
29 Jurgen Habermas. Tile Structural Transformation of tile Pu/Jlic Spllere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence 
(Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. 1991 ). 
30 The history of communication. and of book publishing and the press in par­
ticular. has attracted enormous interest in the past few decades. Among the most 
important of these works for the history of the French Enlightenment and Revolu­
tion are: Robert Darnton, The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the 
Encyclopedie, 17 7 5-1800 ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 19 79 ): The Forbid­
den Best-sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (New York: Norton. 199 5 ): Jack R. Censer 
and Jeremy D. Popkin. eds .. Press and Politics in Pre-Revolutionary France (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 198 7): Popkin, Revolutionary News: The Press in 
France, 1789-1799 (Durham: Duke University Press. 1990): Censer. The French 
Press in the Age of Enlightenment (New York and London: Routledge. 1994); Sarah 
Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Celebres of Prerevolutionary France 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 199 3 ); and Carla Hesse, Publishing and Cul­
tural Politics in Revolutionary Paris, 17 89-1810 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991 ). On the role of the salons in the communication of Enlightenment ideas 
see Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlight­
enment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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book publishing and has more recently begun examining the character 
of "the news" in eighteenth-century France. In the selection excerpted 
for this volume, he addresses the question of "the influence of forbidden 
books" on the Revolution. 
Previous historians, most notably Daniel Mornet, have attempted 
to determine the extent to which books influenced the opinions of 
eighteenth-century readers. For Mornet the result of Enlightenment lit­
erature was a product that he vaguely called "intelligence," and this 
quality he saw as one of the principal causes of the Revolution. 31 Baker 
has criticized Mornet for the lack of clarity in his concept of "intelli­
gence" and for drawing a false dichotomy between "intellectual causes" 
( deriving from books) and "political causes 
.. 
( deriving from "situations 
or events"). Chartier has criticized him on similar grounds. adding that 
"the diffusion of ideas" is not "a simple imposition." In other words. he 
argues, eighteenth-century readers did not siinply absorb ideas from the 
books they read in an uncritical or unquestioning manner. but rather 
interpreted and thus transfonned the content of what they read in light 
of their own beliefs and experiences. 
Darnton's analysis of the impact of books departs fro1n Mornet's in 
three ways. First. whereas Mornet \!\1as priinarily interested in the influ­
ence of the High Enlightenment. i.e. books \Vritten by pllilosoplzes, 
Darnton takes as his subject 1natter the anonymous libels, often porno­
graphic in nature, \!\7hich attacked the royal family. the French court and 
the clergy. Second. like Chartier. Darnton rejects the notion that readers 
simply accept what they read. that their minds are like "soft \i\7ax." and 
emphasizes the need to understand /low readers appropriate and trans­
form the messages conveyed by authors. Third. he places his study of 
books in the context of other media. noting that ideas spread via "gossip. 
songs, letters, prints. posters. books, pamphlets. manuscript gazettes. 
and newspapers of sorts - foreign periodicals and the official, heavily 
censored French press." In studying larger net\vorks of com1nunication. 
he argues, one sees the prominence and persistence of certain ideas, 
which have a longer life and greater impact than if they had been con­
veyed from books alone. For Darnton the most important of these ideas 
is that of a monarchy having degenerated into despotism. He does not 
argue that this idea "caused" the Revolution, but that its acceptance by 
a large number of French subjects made them more sympathetic to an 
anti-monarchical position when the revolutionary situation came 
about. 
31 Daniel Mornet, Les Origines intellectuelles de la Revolution fraraise (Paris: A. 
Colin, 1933). 
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Colin Jones also combines the methods of intellectual and social 
history. Like Furet, Chartier and Darn ton, he is interested in ideas as well 
as practices, language as well as institutions, discourse as well as the 
interests of classes and professional groups. Indeed, it is a sign of the 
strength of the "linguistic turn" that Jones, who in 1991 lamented that 
for Baker and likeminded historians "discourse reigns supreme and 
social factors bulk exceeding small." 32 by 199 h was employing discourse 
analysis himself. In his "Great Chain of Buying" (chapter 5 ). Jones 
argues that the bourgeoisie used a medical discourse. employing terms 
such as "constitution," "regime." and "circulation" to expose the 
reputed deficiencies in the French state and thereby to legitimize their 
attempts at political reform. His analysis. however. is not limited to lan­
guage. Like Furet, Chartier and Darn ton. Jones is interested in the soci­
ological conditions that made specific discourses possible. As with 
Chartier and Darnton, he approaches his topic from the perspective of 
a historian of communication; his particular topic here involves the 
history of the provincial press. Like other historians with similar inter­
ests. he invokes Habermas·s concept of the public sphere. yet he follows 
the Marxist social philosopher more scrupulously by insisting on the 
bourueois character of the public sphere and. like Habermas. connecting 
it "to the growth of capitalist relations of production." Paradoxically. 
then. Jones has used the very methods that Furet advocated in his cri­
tique of Marxist interpretations to rehabilitate their claim that a rising 
bourgeoisie led to the Revolution. Like Furet, and Cochin before him. 
Jones examines the "sociological conditions" of revolutionary con­
sciousness. yet these conditions turn out to be determined by economic 
factors. Still. if Jones is more of a Marxist than others who have shown 
an interest in the social structures behind the production of ideas. he 
is no more of a "social" historian than many of his non-Marxist, 
linguistically-inclined colleagues. 
Religion and Revolution 
If Furet informed discussions of the relationship between ideas, social 
configurations and history, it is perhaps not surprising that he displayed 
an interest in the role of religion in the French Revolution. After all. as 
the sociologist Emile Durkheim ( 18 5 8-1 91 7) observed. religion is 
inseparable from the workings of any society and indeed functions as a 
32 Colin Jones. "Bourgeois Revolution Revivified: 1789 and Social Change." in 
Colin Lucas. ed .. Rewriting the French Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1991), 75. 
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means of holding societies together. 3 3 Furet saw political convictions in 
particular as greatly resembling religious faith. He described his aca­
demic opponents in religious or clerical terms. referring to them as "true 
believers" in the "revolutionary catechism" or "Lenino-populist 
vulgate." He called them "disciples" who denounced any differing inter­
pretation of the Revolution as "heresy .
.
. 34 This language had rhetorical 
value insofar as it ironically suggested that Furet's adversaries were 
more like priests than the revolutionaries they claimed to be. Yet it was 
not merely a rhetorical flourish. The use of religious terminology was 
rooted in Furet's conception of the religious character of revolutionary 
ideology more generally. 
Like Tocqueville. who noticed that "though its objectives were politi­
cal. the French Revolution followed the lines of a religious revolution .
.. 11
Furet compared the object of his investigation to "the religious wars of 
the sixteenth century.·· He found that in both cases human action was 
heavily invested with moral meaning. but that in the French Revolution 
"man . . .  knew that he was saved or condemned 
.. depending upon the 
history that "he" was evidently in the process of making. Furet called 
this belief a "lay eschatology .
.. 
referring to the prophetic End of Days at 
which time. according to Christian theology. God will judge all human 
actions. Combined with the conviction that "the Revolution had no 
objective limits. only enemies." this belief constituted "a credo whose 
acceptance or rejection separated the good from the wicked." Furet's 
analysis of revolutionary ideology in religious terms. like that of Toc­
queville. is suggestive. yet neither the one nor the other explains where 
the fervor that supposedly characterized the revolutionaries came from. 
This failure in turn highlights the larger problem. which Furet raised 
and other historians have examined. of the relationship between the 
Revolution and its "origins." In particular. how could a "religious revo­
lution" have come out of a period known for its secular character? How 
could it have been the product of the famously irreligious Enlighten­
ment or. in Furet' s own terms. the "offspring of philosoplzie"? 
Dale Van Kley addresses this question in his "Church. State. and the 
Ideological Origins of the French Revolution: The Debate over the 
General Assembly of the Gallican Clergy in 1765" (chapter 9). In this 
article Van Kley argues that many of the political ideas that would char­
acterize the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods developed in 
pre-revolutionary disputes between believing Catholics over the proper 
3 3 For Durkheim's theories on religion and society see his Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Free Press, 19 6 5 ). 
34 Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 81, 82, 89. 
3 5 Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, 10-13. 
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organization of the French church. Liberal ideas of representative gov­
ernment and radical notions of the sovereignty of the "nation," Van 
Kley maintains, were largely developed by "conciliarists" who preferred 
to see the church governed by lay councils and parish priests rather than 
bishops. Meanwhile, bishops jealous of their power within the church 
allied themselves with the crown, thus promoting the conservative 
ideology of "throne and altar." On the right as well as the left - and Van 
Kley suggests that these terms are not anachronistic when applied to the 
pre-revolutionary period - disputants made use of the language of the 
Enlightenment. By extension, Van Kley argues that the Enlightenment 
itself. which \,vas more a "set of appeals" (to reason. nature, rights, hap­
piness. etc.) than a coherent doctrine. was not inevitably anti-religious. 
Like Tocqueville's and Furef s analysis of the Revolution's origins. 
Van Kley's interpretation of the religious roots of revolutionary and 
post-revolutionary political thought emphasizes continuities. Yet other 
historians interested in the Revolution's religious aspects have focused 
on the discontinuities or breaks that they have seen as distinguishing 
the Old Regime from the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. 
In her landmark book Ln Fl'te revolutiomwire. Mona CJzouf explains the 
phenomenon of revolutionary festivals. which previous historians had 
dismissed as curiosities or exercises in partisan propaganda, as a mani­
festation of the collective human need for the sacred. The conclusion to 
the English tran�lation of Ozouf's study. excerpted in this volume 
( chapter 10 ). sum1narizes the book's findings. Ozouf argues that the 
revolutionaries. after attacking traditional Catholic worship as "fanati­
cal." "superstitious" and supportive of "tyranny." nevertheless under­
stood the urgent need to substitute the old forms of religious life with 
new doctrines. symbols and. above all, rituals. Ozouf judges the revolu­
tionary festivals as successful in providing the sense of the sacred that 
Catholicism had previously furnished. Here she appears indebted to 
Durkheim's insight, which Furet seems to have shared, that all societies, 
whether "modern" or "pre-modern." need rituals in which they recog­
nize and sacralize themselves. Ozouf emphasizes a particular aspect of 
the sacred experience that the revolutionary festivals apparently mani­
fested: namely the sense of inauguration or beginning anew. She finds 
in the symbolism. language, and rituals of the revolutionary festivals a 
conviction that humanity was transcending its unhappy past and 
embarking on an entirely new period in history. This new age, accord­
ing to the revolutionary faith. would be characterized by the perfect inte­
gration of individuals with the social order and the achievement of the 
creative potential inherent in human beings. Yet whereas Furet warned 
against taking the revolutionaries at their word when they proclaimed 
(through their principal documents) that they were breaking from their 
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past, Ozouf suggests that they were doing precisely what they said 
they were doing. By the time Napoleon took power in 1799, she argues, 
the "transfer of sacrality" was complete. The ne\.v "social and political 
values" that the Revolution had promoted, "[r]ights, liberty, and 
the fatherland," were now widely treated as sacred. Thus the "Revolu­
tionary festival" was "exactly what it wanted to be: the beginning of a 
new era." 
Like Ozouf, Lynn Hunt understands the Revolution as truly marking 
a break from the preceding period. She also shares Ozouf's Durkheimian 
sense that the Revolution involved an attempt to sacralize new values. 
In her Family Romance of the French Revolution she describes the process 
by which revolutionaries broke with the traditional way of imagining 
the state, i.e. as a family with the king as father, queen as mother and 
subjects as children, and replaced this configuration with "one in which 
the parents were effaced and the children, especially the brothers, acted 
autonomously."36 In her chapter "The Band of Brothers" (chapter 8), 
she examines the attempts of revolutionaries to sacralize the fraternal 
community that they believed themselves to be instituting. Focusing on 
the period between the arrest of the king and queen and the end of the 
Reign of Terror, Hunt studies the revolutionaries much as an anthro­
pologist might study the religious beliefs and practices of a particular 
group. In this guise she tests the claims of a prominent theorist of reli­
gion, Rene Girard. According to Girard, violence is endemic to all soci­
eties, yet those that channel it into a symbolic sacrificial object or 
scapegoat are able to achieve domestic peace. 37 Hunt observes that the 
revolutionaries were engaged in precisely such a scapegoat killing when 
they executed the king in January 1 79 3, that contemporaries ref erred 
to the event as though it had sacred meaning, but that this act of vio­
lence did not function as Girard's theory would suggest, as "[t]housands 
more victims of every social class, both men and women, proceeded to 
the guillotine after him." 
Psychology: "the historian's unacknowledged principal aide" 
Speculation on the religious needs of societies, the relationship between 
guilt, punishment and the sacred, borders inevitably on the field of 
psychology. Hunt makes her debt to psychoanalytical theory explicit. 
Indeed, the very title of her book alludes to Sigmund Freud's concept of 
36 Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1991), xiv. 
3 7 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977). 
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the "family romance." According to Freud, certain children (primarily 
boys) responded to anger at their parents by imagining that they were 
not. in fact. their true parents. Their real parents, according to the form 
the fantasy typically took, were of a higher social rank. 38 Hunt does not 
apply Freud's theory literally to the case of the French Revolution. After 
all, the revolutionaries, having abolished inherited rank and proclaimed 
the principle of human equality, could not easily have imagined any 
family to which they belonged. literally or metaphorically , in terms of 
elevated rank. Yet Hunt notes that family metaphors were a primary 
way of imagining the French state and society. both before and during 
the Revolution. And if the king and queen had functioned as father and 
mother to their French "children." then the replacement of this family 
arrangement with a "band of brothers" must have had psychological 
implications. In particular. Hunt suggests. the "parricides'' felt guilty 
about the murder of their figurative parents. Here she draws on another 
work of Freud's, Totem nnd Taiwo. in which the founder of psychoanaly­
sis speculated that law and society originated from the psychological 
consequences of an act of parricide. l l) Hunt's subjects apparently 
betrayed their sense of guilt through their silence regarding the killing 
of their monarchs. or. alternatively. through their passionate demands 
for silence on the matter. Yet this urge to silence and forgetting competed 
with the need to commemorate and legitimize the founding of the new 
family: the "nation." Silence and speaking, suppressing and remember­
ing thus alternated in a neurotic cycle. 
Ozouf ·s investigation of the religious or sacred aspects of the revolu­
tionary experience similarly crosses the border into the field of psychol­
ogy. Ozouf also considers Freud in her analysis of the revolutionary 
festivals. She notes ( in a section of her book not excerpted in this 
volume) that if Durkheim saw festivals as opportunities for any given 
society's integration and redoubled commitment to its rules, Freud 
understood festivals as moments of transgression, points at which the 
normal rules governing social behavior were violated. On the basis of 
her examination of thousands of revolutionary festivals, Ozouf con­
cludes that Durkheim was closer to the truth than Freud. 40 Despite her 
criticism of Freud, however, she does not reject the attempt to under­
stand the psychology of the historical actors she has chosen to investi­
gate. Indeed, she repeatedly describes the psychological condition of 
3 8 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 19 59 ). vol. 9, 
2 3 5-41. Cf. Hunt. Family Romance, xiii. 
39 Freud, Standard Edition, vol. 13. 1-162. 
40 Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution, trans. Alan Sheridan ( Cam­
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 102-3. 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 23 
people who lived at the time of the Revolution. She refers to the "visceral 
... fear" that prevented revolutionary officials from intervening in 
unauthorized nocturnal burials. She tries to "imagine the feelings of the 
civil servants" when they saw the persistence of Christmas pageants 
despite the attempt of revolutionaries to suppress them. She credits "the 
emotion aroused among the sans-culottes" for the ceremonial accla­
mation of Marat. Finally, she describes the "obsession with ceremonies" 
among the revolutionaries, their "obsessive ... recourse to antiquity" 
and "frantic desire to purge." 
The combination of psychological and historical analysis is typically 
called "psychohistory." After enjoying a brief vogue from the late 19 SOs 
into the 19 70s, it has lost much of its prestige, though vociferous critics 
were present from the beginning. Today the very word "psychohistory" 
is practically a term of abuse among professional historians.41 This bias 
is particularly ironic when one considers that psychological conditions 
are among the most fundamental of historical data. How people in the 
past felt, what attracted them and what repelled them, what they feared 
and what hopes they maintained, are not only questions that stimulate 
the curiosity of so many historians. They are crucial in the formulation 
of historical explanations. In other words, psychological conditions 
matter. They are not the only things that matter. Nor are they easily dis­
covered. Indeed, they are among the most elusive of historical facts. Yet 
they matter nonetheless. Moreover, historians often acknowledge the 
importance of understanding psychological conditions, even if they fail 
to make this explicit or to avail themselves of psychological theories. 
Peter Gay writes: 
The professional historian has always been a psychologist - an amateur 
psychologist. Whether he knows it or not, he operates with a theory of 
human nature; he attributes motives, studies passions, analyzes irra­
tionality, and constructs his work on the tacit conviction that human 
beings display certain stable and discernible traits, certain predictable, or 
at least discoverable, modes of coping with their experience ... Among 
all his auxiliary sciences, psychology is the historian's unacknowledged 
principal aide. 42
Any review of the historiography of the French Revolution would seem 
to support Gay's contention. Indeed, Furet himself, who stimulated the 
41 Perhaps the best-known denunciation of psychohistory is still David E. 
Stannard's Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
42 Peter Gay, Freud for Historians (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985), 6. 
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discussion of so many matters relating to the French Revolution, also 
raised crucial psychological questions. In some places he seems to have 
disparaged psychological speculation. He criticized Michelet for having 
written "a history . .. made up of discoveries of the heart and marked 
by an intuitive grasp of men's souls and actors' motives." Yet he praised 
Tocqueville for having seen "the discrepancy ... between the intentions 
of the actors and the historical role they played," thus implying that 
Tocqueville similarly understood their intentions. Furthermore, Furet 
repeatedly used psychological language in his analysis. He claimed that 
the monarchy's concessions in 1788 "opened up a vast field for the 
deployment of ideas and social passions ." He stated that by the summer 
of 1789 "thought and speech were liberated. not only from censorship 
and the police - as. in fact. they had been for some years - but from the 
internal inhibition created \,vhen voluntary consent is given to age-old 
institutions ." Curiously. he also claimed that "revolutionary society 
exorcised the curse that \,veighed upon it by reconsecrating [power] in a 
manner that was the very opposite of that of the Ancien Regime." thus 
suggesting that the psychological legacy of the Old Regime was not yet 
overcome and had to be "exorcised." Yet both statements reveal a 
common interest in the feelings and inhibitions of the revolutionaries. 
Furet described "the frenzied collective preoccupation \Vith power that 
. .. shaped the political battles of the Revolution" and wrote that "the 
plot \Vas the figment of a frenzied preoccupation with power." Elsewhere 
he depicted this .. collectively shared image of power" as a "phantasm," 
and suggested a kind of collective paranoia when he wrote that "the 
Revolution invented formidable enemies for itself . 
.. 
Even when he was 
not using terms such as "frenzied," "figment," and "phantasm" to 
describe the revolutionaries, Furet implicitly analyzed their psychologi­
cal state and moreover judged it to be abnormal. He faulted historians 
for presuming that the Revolution was the "normal" response to sup­
posedly intolerable conditions. The implication is that revolutionary 
behavior was abnormal. Consequently, Furet underscores the question 
of precisely what sort of mental state characterized the revolutionaries. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that other historians have raised psy­
chological questions about the origins or character of the French Re­
volution. Roger Chartier stresses the importance of "automatic and 
obligatory loyalties" or, more exactly, the erosion of these loyalties, in 
the fall of the French monarchy. He also authorizes speculation on the 
"temperament" of the historical actors in question, contrasting, with 
the nineteenth-century historian Edgar Quinet (1803-75), "the inflex­
ible nature of the religious reformers of the sixteenth century and 
the more malleable temper of the revolutionaries of the eighteenth 
century." He suggests the possibility of understanding "variations in the 
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structure of personality" in order to learn what was distinctive about 
the "psychic economy" - a term he borrows from the German sociolo­
gist Norbert Elias (1897-1990) - of the eighteenth-century French. 
Robert Darnton, although he disagrees with Chartier on when and how 
the French lost their affection for the king and queen, nevertheless pre­
sumes that by 1785 "[y]ears of slander had damaged something fun­
damental in the people's attachment to the monarchy." He attributes 
much of this disaffection to books, which "aroused emotions and stirred 
thoughts with a power we can barely imagine today," whereas for 
Chartier anti-monarchical literature only reflected a "previous ... 
affective disinvestment. "43 Yet both historians seem to believe that the 
emotions of the eighteenth-century French are not only discernible, but 
crucial for understanding the origins of the French Revolution. Simi­
larly, Jones reports on the mental condition of provincial editors of 
advertising supplements, calling them "happy ... to a man" and noting 
that for them "the market held few terrors." Maza presents a very dif­
ferent picture of literate French people in the second half of the eight­
eenth century. She finds a "fear of 'luxury'," "panic over its effects," 
and "an acute sense of moral void and social dissolution" resulting from 
the burgeoning of the consumer market. Yet both historians are confi­
dent in their ability to detect such emotions as fear, dread, and happi­
ness. Indeed, Maza goes so far as to generalize her claims about the 
psychological condition of the French, as she writes of "the devastating 
effects of the Seven Years' War on the national psyche." Combining the 
related phenomena of psychology and religion, moreover, she explains 
the late eighteenth-century enthusiasm for sentimental art farms and 
"social morality" as "an attempt to promote new forms of spiritual ful­
fillment in one's sense of connectedness to a community of fellow 
human beings." 
If one expands the realm of the psychological from that of emotions 
to the workings of the mind more generally, to thinking as well as 
feeling, then the presence of psychology in the historiography of the 
French Revolution is more pervasive still. The prevalence of the word 
"consciousness" is merely one indication of this phenomenon. Furet 
referred repeatedly to the term, though without ever precisely defining 
it. Jones writes of "class consciousness" among members of the bour­
geoisie. Maza highlights the question of "middle-class consciousness" in 
the very title of her article, and though she finds it to be non-existent, 
she discovers another kind of consciousness, which imagined society as 
a single family held together by altruistic feelings and behavior. Baker 
43 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, trans. Lydia 
Cochrane (Durham: Duke University Press, 19 91), 8 6. 
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focuses on "intellection," Chartier writes of "systems of perception," 
and Darnton attempts to reconstruct the ''mental world" of eighteenth­
century French readers, yet all of these terms are simply different ways 
of expressing a single goal: an understanding of how human minds 
made sense of or constructed reality. If one adds the unconscious to the 
elements of the mind one wishes to study, then the full range of mental 
activity, the full scope of psychological investigation, can be understood 
as falling under the purview of the historian. Yet even if one excludes 
this arena as inaccessible, the points of connection between history and 
psychology are quite numerous indeed. 
Thus history cannot be separated from psychology, and historians 
will return to psychological questions whether they explicitly address 
psychological theories (as Hunt does) or engage in a lay analysis of cog­
nitive processes, "mental representations," anxieties, "frenzies" and 
"phantasms.'' In this respect, what is striking about the historiography 
of the French Revolution, a subject in which emotions and ideas play 
as great a role as in any historical period, is not the prevalence of psy­
chological theory, but its relative absence. Hopefully, future work on the 
Revolution will profit from the vast discipline of psychology. After all, if 
attempts to combine history with various other fields have invigorated 
historiography. why should the combination of history and psychology 
prove any less fruitful? 
History among the Disciplines 
But here I am begging the question of just how valuable such combi­
nations have been. The key word in this discussion is interdisciplinarity, 
or the crossing of boundaries between academic disciplines. Should 
scholars strive for interdisciplinarity? Should they borrow concepts, 
models and methods from other fields, or ought they to remain within 
the boundaries assigned by the conventions of their own disciplines? 
This is a very large pair of questions, which has been repeatedly debated 
and will no doubt continue to attract attention in academic publications 
as well as departmental and f acuity meetings at colleges and univer­
sities throughout the world. It cannot be treated exhaustively here, yet 
the readings collected in this volume afford an opportunity to examine 
the implications of interdisciplinarity for the historiography of the 
French Revolution in particular and the field of history more generally. 
As these readings show, the historiography of the Revolution over the 
last three decades has been highly interdisciplinary indeed. In order to 
describe and explain the Revolution historians have borrowed concepts, 
models and methods from sociology, political science, economics, 
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anthropology, literary criticism, linguistics, philosophy, psychology, 
religion, art history, and the already highly interdisciplinary fields of 
gender studies and cultural studies. A common complaint about this 
sort of eclecticism is its perceived tendency to pollute historical writing 
with jargon. Yet the historian Peter Burke has pithily defined jargon as 
"little more than the other person's concepts."'±'± Terms like "discourse," 
"public sphere," and "sacrality" might offend one's sensibilities when 
read or heard for the first time. This reaction. however. is more a result 
of unfamiliarity than anything inherent in the words themselves. Once 
understood, they can be rejected as lacking sufficient relevance or 
explanatory power, yet in some cases at least they will clarify more than 
they obscure. Advanced students and professional scholars often 
assume that they are finished learning "vocabulary" and therefore 
impatiently reject unfamiliar terms as useless. especially if these come 
from disciplines in which they have had little instruction. A commit­
ment to learn "other people's concepts'' and at least to consider their 
applicability to one's own subject matter is well worth the required time 
and effort. 
Learning from other disciplines is all the more advisable insofar as the 
scope of history inevitably includes their subject matter. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines "history" as "[t]hat branch of knowledge 
which deals with past events. as recorded in writings or otherwise ascer­
tained: the formal record of the past. esp. of human affairs or actions ... 
Of course, in practice historians necessarily reduce this unimaginably 
vast purview by specializing according to period, place. and a compar­
atively manageable set of themes. But what are these themes? It would 
be impossible to write an exhaustive list. but some of the most obvious 
candidates are: the pursuit of power. wealth and status: the production 
and consumption of objects and use of technologies: the organization 
of communities: the perception and treatment of insiders and outsiders: 
attempts at creating and communicating meaning through symbols 
and rituals: mental divisions between good and evil, sacred and profane: 
feelings of attraction and aversion, impulses toward creation and 
destruction, peace and war: and the complicated relationship between 
human beings and the natural world. In short, history concerns itself. 
at least potentially, with nothing less than the totality of the human con­
dition. It is therefore the natural partner of other disciplines that take 
as their subject any aspect of that condition. 
This defense of interdisciplinarity is not new. It echoes the call for 
"total history," articulated in 1966 by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie but 
44 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 
44.
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implicitly advocated as early as the 19 20s by his predecessors in the 
so-called Annales school , who combined such diverse interests as geo­
graphy, demography, meteorology, sociology, psychology, and anthro­
pology. 45 One finds sympathy for interdisciplinarity earlier still in the 
"New History" of James Harvey Robinson. an American historian of the 
French Revolution who in 1912 declared that since "History includes 
every trace and vestige of everything that man has done or thought 
since he first appeared on the earth." it would be necessary for historians 
to study. among other things, anthropology. sociology, "Prehistoric 
archaeology." "Social and Animal psychology." "the Comparative study 
of religions." and "Political economy. "4h This optimism about the ability
of historians to synthesize the kno\vledge of so many fields might appear 
na'ive. perhaps even arrogant . The project appears more defensible, 
however. if the knowledge of the human past as informed by the rele­
vant disciplines is seen as a goal that can never truly be reached but 
toward which it is \Vorth striving. an ideal standard against vvhich schol­
arship can be 1neasured. 
In some respects. moreover. history can be understood as an inher­
ently interdisciplinary subject. which in fact conformed to the principles 
of Amwles and the New History long before they were articulated. One 
could argue that Herodotus. the ancient Greek historian and reputed 
"father of history." was an anthropologist. a geographer. a politlcal sci­
entist and moral philosopher in addition to being a historian . Closer to 
the period with vvhich we are concerned here. David Hume. vvho \Nas 
at once a philosopher, psychologist. sociologist and historian. believed 
history capable of revealing "the constant and universal principles of 
human nature" and "the regular springs of human action and behav­
iour. " 47 His polymath contemporary. Voltaire, wrote histories that paid 
attention to laws and customs, religious beliefs , economic practices, sci­
entific endeavors. as well as politics , diplomacy and war. Both Hume and 
Voltaire exemplified the Enlightenment belief. best expressed in the 
project of the Encyclopedie, in the underlying unity of disparate branches 
of knowledge. The nineteenth-century historians of the French Revolu-
45 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Peasants of La11guedoc. trans. John Day (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press. 1974). On the "A1111ales school" see Peter Burke. The 
French Historical Revolution: The Anna/es School 1929-89 (Stanford: Stanford Uni­
versity Press. 1990). 
46 James Harvey Robinson. The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern His­
torical Outlook (New York: Macmillan, 1912), cited in Burke. French Historical Re­
volution, 9. On Robinson's continuing relevance for an understanding of the French 
Revolution see Lynn Hunt, "Forgetting and Remembering: The French Revolution 
Then and Now." American Historical Review l 00 (October 199 5 ): 1119-3 5. 
4 7 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 7 5). 8 3. 
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tion inherited the conviction that history must inform and be inf or med 
by other branches of knowledge. Tocqueville, for example. was not 
simply interested in recounting the history of the Old Regime and 
seeking the origins of the French Revolution. He wished to know when 
and why revolutions occur. under what conditions status matters more 
than wealth or power, how religious inclinations affect political ideas 
and actions. how and when the organization of a polity influences the 
beliefs of its members. and under what conditions democracy is pos­
sible. He therefore shared the concerns of the political scientist and soci­
ologist with those of the historian. Similarly. Karl Marx maintained 
theories of human nature. psychological notions of consciousness and 
alienation. economic theories of \'alue and a dialectical model of history 
(inherited from Hegel) in which pritnitive forms of social and economic 
organization vvould collapse under the weight of their contradictions 
and give way to higher stages of historical dcvelopn1ent. Insofar as 
his disciples. including the Marxist historians of the French Revolu­
tion. have shared his assurnptions. they too have crossed disciplinary 
boundaries. 
Thus the interdisciplinarity of the work collected here is not in and 
of itself new. What is new is the precise cornbinations between history 
and the other branches of knowledge. The decline - relative though not 
definitive - of Marxist assumptions has opened up the historiography 
of the French Revolution to possible cornbinations unthinkable during 
the heyday of the old orthodoxy. The study of political ideas. once widely 
viewed as mere "ideology" masking more fundamental class interests. 
has flourished in the new historiography. Language and symbols are no 
longer seen merely as tools of class domination, but as defining features 
of social identity as well as political contestation. The relative status of 
women and men, once overshadovved by the presumably more funda­
mental relationship between those who owned the means of production 
and those who did not. can now be viewed as integral to an under­
standing of the character and legacy of the Revolution. The study of 
religion, once dismissed as the "opium of the n1asses," can take its right­
ful place in the endeavor to explain how the Revolution came about and 
why it took the form it took. 
As these readings show, history can benefit greatly from the freedom 
and willingness to explore other fields. Yet it does not merely take. It 
offers something in return. It provides a temporal aspect, an account of 
human experience at a time that no longer exists. Only the collection 
and interpretation of the traces of the past, whether in documents or 
artifacts, can enable us to know which aspects of the human condition 
are new and which are old, how and to what extent the past is like the 
present. Whether the historian will find "regular springs of human 
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action and behavior," as Hume would contend, or irregular springs, or 
different mechanisms altogether, are hypotheses that only the study of 
history can test. And if one determines that people have changed in 
some fundamental way from the past to the present, this does not tell us 
whether that difference was continuous. There is no better way to 
examine such questions of continuity and change than to study a re­
volution, which by definition is a break but which, upon closer investi­
gation, might yield surprising continuities, perhaps even toward our 
own day. 
